LILIES OF BRISTOL:
Welfare Costs for Being a Great Woman?

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Agenda

- Phenomenon
- Literature & Definitions
- Research Question
- Hypotheses
- Data & Methods
- Preliminary Results


THE WOMEN WHO BUILT
BRISTOL 1184-2018
Jane Duffus


THE TIMELESS CLASSIC OF LOVE AND FAITH
THE LILIES OF THE FIELD
WILLIAM E. BARRETT


SIDNEY POITIER
LILIES OF THE FIELD


LILIES OF THE FIELD
Marginal People Who Live for the Moment
edited by
Sophie Day
Evthymios Papataxiarchis
Michael Stewart
STUDIES IN THE ETHNOGRAPHIC IMAGINATION

Phenomenon



" … a newborn baby girl 82.9 years if mortality rates remain the same as they were in the UK in 2014 to 2016 throughout their lives."

ONS: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/lifeexpectancies/bulletins/nationallifetablesunitedkingdom/2014to2016

Literature

Intrinsic Motivation:

- Psychological motivation
- Consumption and investment
- Crowding out and endogeneity

Altruism

- Motivation – natural cost benefit analysis
- Effects – welfare gains

Literature – indiv. prosocial behaviour

- Psychological motivation
  - (Taylor; Maslow, Herzberg) -> Skitovsky (1976)
  - Wilson & Butler (1978) "Race and Job Satisfaction in the Military", Sociological Quarterly 19:626-638.
  - Mueller & McDuff (2004) Clergy-Congregation Mismatches and Clergy Job Satisfaction, J. of the Scientific Study of Religion 43(2): 261-273.

- Consumption and investment
  - Benabou & Tirole (2003) Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, Review of Econ. Studies 70: 489–520
  - Delfgaauw & Dur (2005) Signaling and Screening of WorkersíMotivation, Tinbergen Institute TI 2002-050/3

- Crowding out and endogeneity
  - Frey & Jegen (2001) Motivation Crowding Theory, J of Econ. Surveys, 15(5): 589-611
  - Brunoa & Fiorillo (2012) Why without pay?, J of Socio-Economics 41(5): 659-669.
  - Besley & Ghatak (2016) Market Incentives and the Evolution of Intrinsic Motivation, Manuscript.
  - Czaicki et al. (2018) Do incentives undermine intrinsic motivation? Increases in intrinsic motivation within an incentive-based intervention for people living with HIV in Tanzania, PLOS One.

Altruism

- Motivation – natural cost benefit analysis - Hamilton's Rule – Becker (1974); **Bergstrom (1986);**
- Effects – welfare gains – Pearson (2016): **The Life Project: The Extraordinary Story of 70,000 Ordinary Lives**

Besley and Ghatak (2016)
Market Incentives and the Evolution of Intrinsic Motivation

- Durkheim (1893) and Polanyi (1944)
- transformation in culture is a sine qua non of economic change

Bourdieu (1998)
Masculine Domination, Standford Uni Press: Stanford.

- Social construct

Question:

- What personal characteristics & actions determine their longevity?
- How the social construct affects their longevity?

- *H01: Lilies' longevity depends on their 'ends and means'.*

$$LILIES\ Longevity = \beta_1 Demogr + \beta_2 Altruism + + \beta_3 Econ\_class + e_1, \qquad (1)$$

- *H02: Lilies' longevity depends on the social construct (endogenous to economic dev.).*

$$LILIES\ Longevity = \beta_1 Indiv\_controls + \beta_2 Historic\_Events + e_2, \qquad (2.1)$$

$$+ \beta_2 F\_Historic\_Events + e_2, \qquad (2.2)$$

$$+ \beta_2 Inequality + e_2, \qquad (2.3)$$

Data

- 250 great women from Bristol – 1184 – 2018
  - occupation, parents status, marital status, own children, economic class
  - altruistic activity
  - Disability

- Max Planck - ***The Human Mortality Database:***
  - England & Wales, Life expectancy at birth, 1841-2011
  - Cummins (2017) Lifespans of the European Elite, 800-1800, J of Econ History,77(2): 406-439.

- Manchester Metropolitan University – The Women Timeline in the UK

- Atkinson et al. (2017) Chartbook of Economic Inequality
  - share of top 1% in total net wealth – 1900 - 2015

Methods

- OLS - exploration

- Nested model for capturing the social construct

Preliminary Results – 1a



Preliminary Results – 1b

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
longevityc~d	206	74.3301	17.8803	0	107
birth	215	1845.53	79.92302	1184	1974
death	217	1917.627	91.01192	1241	2017
UK_lon~emale	216	64.63199	12.9089	38.17	83.04
UK_lon~_male	185	61.12476	12.68062	36.54	79.42
UK_longev_~l	185	63.64222	13.02018	37.34	81.25
inequality	96	50.03531	15.76319	15.78	72.09
pre_Ind_re~n	260	.0384615	.1926786	0	1
industrial~v	260	.9615385	.1926786	0	1
post_WW2	260	.5461538	.4988255	0	1
suffrage	260	.6730769	.4699936	0	1
post_suffr~e	260	.2461538	.4316	0	1

Preliminary Results – 2a

Table 2a: Historic Event

Source: Author's

```
. reg longevity pre_Ind_revolution post_WW2

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       206
-------------+----------------------------------   F(2, 203)       =     15.97
       Model |  8911.55693         2  4455.77847   Prob > F        =     0.0000
    Residual |  56627.9965       203  278.955648   R-squared       =     0.1360
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =     0.1275
       Total |  65539.5534       205  319.705139   Root MSE        =     16.702

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
longevitycleaned |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-----------------+------------------------------------------------------------
pre_Ind_revolution |  -2.838755   6.527844    -0.43   0.664    -15.70983    10.03232
         post_WW2 |   12.94696   2.368211     5.47   0.000     8.277513    17.61641
            _cons |   68.26733   1.661908    41.08   0.000     64.99051    71.54414
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. gen industrial_rev = death > 1759

. replace industrial_rev = 0 if death > 1946
(140 real changes made)

. reg longevity industrial_rev post_WW2

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       206
-------------+----------------------------------   F(2, 203)       =     15.90
       Model |  8875.95489         2  4437.97745   Prob > F        =     0.0000
    Residual |  56663.5985       203  279.131027   R-squared       =     0.1354
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =     0.1269
       Total |  65539.5534       205  319.705139   Root MSE        =     16.707

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
longevitycle~d |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
---------------+--------------------------------------------------------------
industrial_rev |   1.508613   6.085986     0.25   0.804    -10.49124    13.50847
      post_WW2 |   14.52639   6.092882     2.38   0.018     2.51294    26.53984
         _cons |    66.6725   5.914219    11.27   0.000     55.01132    78.33368
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Preliminary Results – 2b

Table 2b: F_Historic Event

Source: Author's

Linear regression

Number of obs	= 206
F(1, 204)	= 30.56
Prob > F	= 0.0000
R-squared	= 0.1453
Root MSE	= 16.571

longevityc~d	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
suffrage	13.98405	2.529532	5.53	0.000	8.996674	18.97143
_cons	65.70886	2.171766	30.26	0.000	61.42688	69.99085

. reg longevitycleaned post_s, ro

Linear regression

Number of obs	= 206
F(1, 204)	= 1.73
Prob > F	= 0.1895
R-squared	= 0.0133
Root MSE	= 17.804

longevitycl~d	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
post_suffrage	-6.955376	5.283566	-1.32	0.190	-17.37278	3.462024
_cons	75.00538	1.258188	59.61	0.000	72.52466	77.4861

. reg longevitycleaned suf post_s, ro

Linear regression

Number of obs	= 206
F(2, 203)	= 24.15
Prob > F	= 0.0000
R-squared	= 0.1944
Root MSE	= 16.127

longevitycl~d	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
suffrage	16.1603	2.431298	6.65	0.000	11.36646	20.95413
post_suffrage	-13.81916	5.256821	-2.63	0.009	-24.18413	-3.454186
_cons	65.70886	2.177108	30.18	0.000	61.41622	70.00151

Preliminary Results – 2c

Table 2c: Inequality

```
. reg longevitycleaned inequality, ro

Linear regression                               Number of obs     =         96
                                                F(1, 94)          =       0.07
                                                Prob > F          =     0.7936
                                                R-squared         =     0.0014
                                                Root MSE          =     13.637
```

longevityc~d	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
inequality	.0316784	.1207254	0.26	0.794	-.2080247	.2713816
_cons	78.66496	6.626311	11.87	0.000	65.50826	91.82165

Source: Author's

Preliminary Results – 3a

Table 3a: Individual - Descriptive

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
longevity	40	74.025	15.05117	18	100
birth	42	1841.524	124.1909	1184	1943
death	41	1920.244	124.1662	1241	2016
placeofbirth	44	.5681818	.501056	0	1
placeofmai~y	44	.3409091	.479495	0	1
altruistic~y	44	.4545455	.5036862	0	1
imprisonment	44	.1136364	.3210382	0	1
forcered	44	.0681818	.2549717	0	1
interests	44	.3181818	.4711553	0	1
parentalfa~h	44	.3636364	.4866071	0	1
ownfamily	44	.5	.5057805	0	1
widow	44	.1363636	.3471418	0	1
children	44	.25	.4380188	0	1
suffrage	44	.1363636	.3471418	0	1
disabled	44	.1818182	.3901537	0	1
medicine	44	.2045455	.4080325	0	1
edu	44	.1136364	.3210382	0	1
art	44	.2045455	.4080325	0	1
politics	44	.2954545	.4615215	0	1

Source: Author's

Preliminary Results – 3b

Table 3b: Individual - Effects

Linear regression

Number of obs	40
F(9, 30)	2.54
Prob > F	0.0267
R-squared	0.2143
Root MSE	15.212

longevity	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
parentalfamilyrich	3.896548	4.717298	0.83	0.415	-5.737459	13.53056
altruisticactivity	-1.587647	4.209765	-0.38	0.709	-10.18513	7.00984
ownfamily	-13.38112	7.721916	-1.73	0.093	-29.15138	2.389133
widow	15.61002	6.560056	2.38	0.024	2.212602	29.00744
children	13.58566	6.793806	2.00	0.055	-.2891388	27.46047
disabled	-7.662488	6.186156	-1.24	0.225	-20.2963	4.971328
medicine	1.960093	7.285455	0.27	0.790	-12.91879	16.83898
edu	-10.54651	3.426804	-3.08	0.004	-17.54498	-3.548044
politics	-3.928794	4.884333	-0.80	0.428	-13.90393	6.046345
_cons	77.90458	4.412751	17.65	0.000	68.89254	86.91662

Source: Author's

Considerations for further research

- Transcribe individual data for all 250
- Additional 250 artists again from Jane Duffus in 2019
- Nested model

- Any ideas?