The Local Autonomy


Project

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


Metropolitan regions with sub-state (local) governments

Example: Detroit region,


partial view of metropolitan statistical area






Metropolitan regions with sub-state (local) governments


Governance via regional intergovernmental organizations








board of directors

How do local actors serving in regional intergovernmental organizations reconcile tensions between local and regional interests?






















more regional



INDIVIDUAL



elected

low

conservative

position


slack / discretion

ideology

administrative

high

liberal



NETWORK



local / sub-local

public

conservative

scale


sector

ideology


regional /global

private

liberal



LOCAL GOVERNMENT



monocenter / polycenter

strong / weak

strong / weak

metro position

relative health


autonomy

non-center

strong / weak


strong / weak





local autonomy concerns the legal relationship between state and sub-state governments

local autonomy has been used empirically and theoretically as an objective construct



Variation in objective local autonomy does not necessarily track variation in the understanding of it by local actors

- term limits
- lack of professionalization
- reliance on attorney and other staff
- ideological filtering


subjective local autonomy




PROPOSITIONS

subjective local autonomy

- variation within the same class of local government in a state
- variation among individuals working in the same local government
- variation among its component dimensions








Local govs: 327 / 1,436

Respondents: 388 / 6,731



RESEARCH DESIGN

survey: outcome variables

- **Fiscal discretion (taxation; debt)**
- **Territorial discretion (annexation; consolidation)**
- Functional discretion (land use; econ. dev.; cooperation)
- Basic concepts (home rule; Dillon's rule)



RESEARCH DESIGN

survey: outcome variables

- dichotomous measure based on scenario (yes/no)
- ordinal measure of confidence
- ordinal measure of relative autonomy (general)

Knowledge deficits

- Average fiscal score: 2.5 / 3
- Average territorial score: 2.1 / 3
- Average functional score: 6.7 / 14
- Basic concepts: 5.3 / 10
- Overall "grade": 16.6 / 30

Knowledge deficits

- Each additional year in office: +1.37
- Large government (>10,000 pop): +3.42
- Education, gender, political affiliation: N/S
- State, region: N/S

Confidence

- Average fiscal score: +1.10
- Average territorial score: +0.67
- Average functional score: -0.21
- Overall: +0.31 (-3 to +3, forced response)

General autonomy

- Average (relative to in-state peers): -0.76
- Average (relative to out-state peers): -1.12

NEXT STEPS

- **Refining estimation models**
- **Hot-spot** analysis
- Follow-up interviews
- Linking subjective and objective autonomy to regional decision-making

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